A lot of fans have been crying out for more creativity from midfield and groaned every time we see something like Henderson-Wijnaldum-Milner on the teamsheet. Keita and Fabinho coming in in the summer raised expectations for a transition towards a creative goal-scoring midfield; instead in the last couple of months in particular Klopp is reverting more and more towards the tried and true, sometimes derisively called "Brexit midfield." Henderson has been chosen in place of Fabinho in several big games despite the latter's excellent run of form; Keita has been completely shut out despite finding his form after a run of starts in early February. What the hell is Klopp thinking? I think I know the answer, but first we need to check out some numbers. If you're not arsed to read the entire analysis, I have a short summary at the end.
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Milner: 2 non-penalty goals in all competitions, 5 assists.
Wijnaldum: 2 goals, 1 assist
Henderson: 0 goals, 0 assists (!)
Fabinho: 1 goal, 2 assists
Keita: 0 goals, 1 assist
This has been our midfield's attacking output this season: 5 non-penalty goals and 9 assists from 5 players in all competitions. It's dire. Let's see, how does it compare with previous seasons under Klopp?
2017-18: 9 non-penalty goals, 22 assists (not counting Ox)
2016-17: 13 goals, 22 assists (not counting Lallana)
2015-16: 11 goals, 24 assists
Before we move further, a couple statistical outliers that need to be highlighted from within these numbers.
2014-15: 5 goals 11 assists
2013-14: 15 goals 17 assists
2012-13: 7 goals 13 assists
2011-12 (2nd title): 8 goals 15 assists
2010-11 (1st title): 9 goals 16 assists
Something to note: Dortmund typically played in a system with 2 CMs and Klopp employed heavy rotation in these positions, so usually these numbers are a combination for 4-5 midfielders adding 2 or 3 goals each. The one exception is Nuri Sahin's awesome 2010-11 season when he bagged 8 goals and 13 assists and promptly left for Real Madrid.
Before we try to make sense of this all, we need to also compare how our midfielders have individually performed in terms of attacking production for Klopp compared to other managers:
Now, does it actually matter if midfielders are scoring their share of goals? Results show that it doesn't: if you take a look at the numbers above, in Klopp's two title-winning seasons with Dortmund his midfielders have scored similar or less than in the seasons when they didn't win and we're now having statistically our best season in the Premier League era while the midfield numbers on their own seem, like I said, dire. So here is the first important conclusion: Klopp's style doesn't need a lot of attacking contribution from midfielders to win. In fact, it's almost the inverse relationship: his teams have been successful when the midfield was at its most impenetrable, not at its most creative.
I think Klopp has a rather unique view of football and in his style many of the positions are reimagined and should carry different expectations compared to what we're used to. Klopp's full-backs are like other managers' wingers; in Dortmund, converted striker Lukasz Piszczek produced 6 goals and 25 assists from RB position in his first 3 seasons with Klopp and we're now seeing similar record-breaking numbers from Robertson, while Trent is already not far behind and I think he will produce even better numbers than Piszczek in seasons to come. Klopp's strikers, AMs and wing-forwards owe some of the most productive seasons of their career to him (the famous "Klopp effect"), as the likes of Gotze, Reus, Lewandowski, Mane and Salah can testify. What offsets all this and creates a base for the whole construction is the solid midfield which is drilled to deliver the ball in the right areas quickly and consistently and to win it back with such consistency and energy that (as we're now seeing more and more) opponents stop even trying to attack us through the middle altogether. This is good for everyone in the team, but maybe not so good for any midfielders who want to be a little more than just a ball-sucking vacuum. Here's the second important conclusion (supported by the numbers above): the more time Klopp has to work with a midfielder, the more his offensive production declines.
Now, the trend towards a more patient possession-oriented style that we saw earlier in the season was obviously not a fluke. Top-level football is a game of constant adjustment and after blowing everyone away on the counter last season, Klopp very smartly predicted that the league would adjust to us by allowing us possession and closing off any opportunities for quick counters – so he went one step ahead of them and designed a new style of play based around patient build-up and gradually outplaying teams rather then cutting them open like last season. This way of playing might not have particularly suited the likes of Mane and Salah, but results-wise it was a roaring success: we didn't drop a single point against teams outside top 6 until Leicester on the last day of January. As soon as we dropped our first points against a weaker team, Klopp ditched the 4-2-3-1 formation and didn't return to it since. This is also when various modifications of the "Brexit midfield" started appearing with more regularity.
Something else also happened: we started playing more long balls as a team, trying to put Mane and Salah directly through on goal rather than patiently building up as before. Against Spurs at home 15% of our passes were long balls, twice as many as against United at home in December. Against Burnley at home in March we had 11%, compared to 5% against Brighton at home in August. It might seem like an insignificant change, but playing twice as many long balls actually has serious implications, not least that it places more premium on ball-winning midfielders rather than passers, since most long balls lead to turn over in possession. In essence, Klopp has decided that now that the league has started adjusting to our possession-based style, it was time to go back to the same formula as the 2nd half of last season with emphasis on direct counter-attacking playing and high pressing. All of this doesn't mean that the possession-based approach is gone for good; if we are successful in these last months of the season, next season teams will probably start denying us space again and it will be time for another cycle of adjustment.
Before I wrap up, I just want to talk about Keita. He has definitely struggled to adapt in the first few months, as could be expected of any new signing – but he was also unlucky in that as soon as he had a consistent run in the side and looked to have found his place, Klopp decided to change the style back to something where his talents were less useful. I also have an open question whether he will be ultimately happy with being Wijnaldumized, i.e. sacrificing his attacking freedom for the good of the system. Unwillingness to do this is partly why I think Emre Can left – I wrote about this before. If Keita stays, I expect his attacking numbers to drop significantly compared to his days in Germany; it's also possible that he will prove to be Klopp's Pogba and will be better off leaving to play for another manager who allows his midfielders more freedom. In any case, I cannot see a Klopp midfielder ever getting close to double-digit goals or assists unless he is essentially one of the front 4 – and Keita failed his audition in that position in the few games where he started on the LW. Any notion that simply buying a more attack-minded and talented midfielder will radically change Klopp's idea of how he expects his midfielders to play is false; you can sell Keita and Henderson and buy Pogba and Milinkovic-Savic, but Klopp would still ask them primarily to defend, press and cover space and drop them if they don't follow instructions.
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As promised, here's a quick summary:
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Milner: 2 non-penalty goals in all competitions, 5 assists.
Wijnaldum: 2 goals, 1 assist
Henderson: 0 goals, 0 assists (!)
Fabinho: 1 goal, 2 assists
Keita: 0 goals, 1 assist
This has been our midfield's attacking output this season: 5 non-penalty goals and 9 assists from 5 players in all competitions. It's dire. Let's see, how does it compare with previous seasons under Klopp?
2017-18: 9 non-penalty goals, 22 assists (not counting Ox)
2016-17: 13 goals, 22 assists (not counting Lallana)
2015-16: 11 goals, 24 assists
Before we move further, a couple statistical outliers that need to be highlighted from within these numbers.
- In 17-18, Emre Can accounted for 6 goals out of the 9 our midfield scored in all competitions.
- In 16-17, Wijnaldum bagged 6 goals and 11 assists (I had to do a double-take looking at these numbers – Gini really scored 6 and assisted 11 in one season? Can you imagine it now?).
- In the 2 seasons when he played in midfield, Milner produced a lion's share of the assists: 25 to be exact.
2014-15: 5 goals 11 assists
2013-14: 15 goals 17 assists
2012-13: 7 goals 13 assists
2011-12 (2nd title): 8 goals 15 assists
2010-11 (1st title): 9 goals 16 assists
Something to note: Dortmund typically played in a system with 2 CMs and Klopp employed heavy rotation in these positions, so usually these numbers are a combination for 4-5 midfielders adding 2 or 3 goals each. The one exception is Nuri Sahin's awesome 2010-11 season when he bagged 8 goals and 13 assists and promptly left for Real Madrid.
Before we try to make sense of this all, we need to also compare how our midfielders have individually performed in terms of attacking production for Klopp compared to other managers:
- Wijnaldum. Other managers (including national team): 85 goals and 33 assists in 315 games (0.37 G+A/game). Klopp: 10 goals and 16 assists in 129 games (0.20 G+A/game).
- Henderson. Other managers: 25 goals and 46 assists in 317 games (0.23 G+A/game). Klopp: 4 goals and 8 assists in 125 games (0.10 G+A/game)
- Fabinho. Other managers: 10 non-penalty goals and 21 assists in 233 games (0.13 G+A/game). Klopp: 1 goals and 2 assists in 31 games (0.10 G+A/game).
- Milner. Other managers: 55 non-penalty goals and 124 assists in 743 games (0.24 G+A/game). Klopp: 5 goals and 34 assists in 158 games (0.25 G+A/game).
- Keita. Other managers: 36 goals and 29 assists in 185 games (0.35G+A/game). Klopp: 0 goals and 1 assist in 27 games (0.04 G+A/game).
Now, does it actually matter if midfielders are scoring their share of goals? Results show that it doesn't: if you take a look at the numbers above, in Klopp's two title-winning seasons with Dortmund his midfielders have scored similar or less than in the seasons when they didn't win and we're now having statistically our best season in the Premier League era while the midfield numbers on their own seem, like I said, dire. So here is the first important conclusion: Klopp's style doesn't need a lot of attacking contribution from midfielders to win. In fact, it's almost the inverse relationship: his teams have been successful when the midfield was at its most impenetrable, not at its most creative.
I think Klopp has a rather unique view of football and in his style many of the positions are reimagined and should carry different expectations compared to what we're used to. Klopp's full-backs are like other managers' wingers; in Dortmund, converted striker Lukasz Piszczek produced 6 goals and 25 assists from RB position in his first 3 seasons with Klopp and we're now seeing similar record-breaking numbers from Robertson, while Trent is already not far behind and I think he will produce even better numbers than Piszczek in seasons to come. Klopp's strikers, AMs and wing-forwards owe some of the most productive seasons of their career to him (the famous "Klopp effect"), as the likes of Gotze, Reus, Lewandowski, Mane and Salah can testify. What offsets all this and creates a base for the whole construction is the solid midfield which is drilled to deliver the ball in the right areas quickly and consistently and to win it back with such consistency and energy that (as we're now seeing more and more) opponents stop even trying to attack us through the middle altogether. This is good for everyone in the team, but maybe not so good for any midfielders who want to be a little more than just a ball-sucking vacuum. Here's the second important conclusion (supported by the numbers above): the more time Klopp has to work with a midfielder, the more his offensive production declines.
Now, the trend towards a more patient possession-oriented style that we saw earlier in the season was obviously not a fluke. Top-level football is a game of constant adjustment and after blowing everyone away on the counter last season, Klopp very smartly predicted that the league would adjust to us by allowing us possession and closing off any opportunities for quick counters – so he went one step ahead of them and designed a new style of play based around patient build-up and gradually outplaying teams rather then cutting them open like last season. This way of playing might not have particularly suited the likes of Mane and Salah, but results-wise it was a roaring success: we didn't drop a single point against teams outside top 6 until Leicester on the last day of January. As soon as we dropped our first points against a weaker team, Klopp ditched the 4-2-3-1 formation and didn't return to it since. This is also when various modifications of the "Brexit midfield" started appearing with more regularity.
Something else also happened: we started playing more long balls as a team, trying to put Mane and Salah directly through on goal rather than patiently building up as before. Against Spurs at home 15% of our passes were long balls, twice as many as against United at home in December. Against Burnley at home in March we had 11%, compared to 5% against Brighton at home in August. It might seem like an insignificant change, but playing twice as many long balls actually has serious implications, not least that it places more premium on ball-winning midfielders rather than passers, since most long balls lead to turn over in possession. In essence, Klopp has decided that now that the league has started adjusting to our possession-based style, it was time to go back to the same formula as the 2nd half of last season with emphasis on direct counter-attacking playing and high pressing. All of this doesn't mean that the possession-based approach is gone for good; if we are successful in these last months of the season, next season teams will probably start denying us space again and it will be time for another cycle of adjustment.
Before I wrap up, I just want to talk about Keita. He has definitely struggled to adapt in the first few months, as could be expected of any new signing – but he was also unlucky in that as soon as he had a consistent run in the side and looked to have found his place, Klopp decided to change the style back to something where his talents were less useful. I also have an open question whether he will be ultimately happy with being Wijnaldumized, i.e. sacrificing his attacking freedom for the good of the system. Unwillingness to do this is partly why I think Emre Can left – I wrote about this before. If Keita stays, I expect his attacking numbers to drop significantly compared to his days in Germany; it's also possible that he will prove to be Klopp's Pogba and will be better off leaving to play for another manager who allows his midfielders more freedom. In any case, I cannot see a Klopp midfielder ever getting close to double-digit goals or assists unless he is essentially one of the front 4 – and Keita failed his audition in that position in the few games where he started on the LW. Any notion that simply buying a more attack-minded and talented midfielder will radically change Klopp's idea of how he expects his midfielders to play is false; you can sell Keita and Henderson and buy Pogba and Milinkovic-Savic, but Klopp would still ask them primarily to defend, press and cover space and drop them if they don't follow instructions.
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As promised, here's a quick summary:
- Klopp's style doesn't require a lot of attacking contribution from his midfielders. His winning formula is solid midfield + super attacking full-backs & world-class goal-scorers/creators up front.
- Midfielders who play for Klopp typically assist and score less than they do for other managers – in contrast to full-backs and forwards who increase their numbers as a result of playing in this system.
- Klopp looks to have mostly switched back to the press-and-counter style since February; this resulted in likes of Keita and Shaqiri being overlooked in favor of defensive-minded players.
- Keita's long-term future at LFC will depend on whether he will be willing to curb his attacking and creative instincts to some extent and become a "system player".
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