Are Liverpool breaking a sacred defensive code?
Chris Summersell
Picture the scene. Play is developing in the final third, a player receives the ball between the lines and shapes to pull the trigger from outside the box — how are you expecting your team to deal with this situation? I would venture that there would be almost universal agreement that one of your team should be making every effort to close down the ball and throw themselves in the way to block the impending strike on goal. It’s been an almost inviolable part of football for as long as I can remember, whatever your game model and defensive preferences, if an opponent is going to shoot from whatever range, you do your best to prevent it.
I have been subtly challenging this lately, asking myself whether attempting to block all shots from long range is a smart decision or not? We have learned so much in the last decade about expected goals and making better shot choices, but not so much how defences may respond to this knowledge. It stands to reason that if you are trying to create better shot locations, then being content to allow opponents to take on low value shots themselves is a logical step — never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake, in essence.
I guess, however, my coaching instincts cut in, with the thought of weaning myself and the players I coach away from blocking long shots not sitting particularly right. ‘Get out to them and get in the way’ is simply an unchallengeable part of the code. It is the kind of thing that will get you failed on a coaching qualification if you dared to be different.
It was then watching Liverpool play Inter Milan in the Champions League that something caught my attention. Like the scene described earlier, Lautaro Martinez is found between the lines facing forward allowing the ball to run across his body before cutting across the ball as it arrows past Alisson into the top corner. A wonderful strike for sure, but once my enjoyment of the goal itself wore off I became puzzled by Virgil Van Dijk’s defensive choice in this situation. Rather than step out and engage Lautaro once he receives the ball and shapes to shoot, VVD stands off him and makes very little attempt to block the ball.
VVD stands off Lautaro Martinez
Now, had this been most other teams and players in world football, I’d have likely muttered about how the defender’s inactivity had led to a crucial goal being conceded and moved on. However, drawing on that subtle questioning of the value in blocking long range shots and my prior knowledge that Liverpool are an incredibly smart operation, with VVD being one of if not the finest centre-backs of his generation, I was intrigued to find out more.
It was time to fire up Instat and take a look at the long range shots Liverpool have conceded this season to see if there was anything at play. I’d like to say instantly I saw an unequivocal trend, but in truth it appeared to be a mixed bag, including one piece of pretty dreadful defending by Joel Matip where his outstretched leg diverted a tame Norwich shot into the opposite corner of the goal. There were however more than a few indicators that Liverpool were running a different policy of dealing with long shots;
Pressure on shooters generally comes from the midfield unit, often with sideways and backwards pressure to disrupt the shooter
Defenders tend to be quite inactive, rarely jumping out of the defensive line to engage and block shots
Defenders, particularly VVD, often make themselves small and tuck their arms and legs in
There were occasions where defenders actively looked to get out of the way of long range shots
You rarely see a Liverpool player running out and diving in to make a block
These observations however are not enough to be conclusive, so it’s time to consult the data. With this, unfortunately missing as I am the Theoretical Physics PHD the Liverpool data science team themselves possess, I went down the slightly longer route using Instat and their handy tool for isolating areas on the pitch (which I just learned about and is ace). Here I isolated shots from outside the box, filtering out direct free kicks and recording the number of shots conceded and how many of those that were blocked. (Note — I ignored shots down the sides of the box, mainly for time purposes but the few shots from this range were not going to skew the data by any great margin).
The results for the Premier League this season were fairly convincing that something might just be going on at Liverpool:
Liverpool’s long shot block percentage is by some distance the least in the league, with Burnley unsurprisingly being the most prolific at blocking long shots in the division. You suspect it would take some convincing for Sean Dyche to rethink this approach any time soon.
I am however always bugged by the variance of small sample sizes, so I decided to look at the 20/21 season too, and would you believe it…
In this instance it is of course a closer affair with Liverpool edging out Spurs as the least likely to block long range shots, though it should be factored in that Liverpool’s defensive injury crisis last season led to a whole swathe of personnel used so it might be expected the block rate would be a little closer to normal, especially considering VVD’s absence as a player who seems particularly wary of getting out and blocking shots. Checking further back, in their 19/20 title winning season, the block rate was down at 24.5% for shots outside the box. I’m wary of drawing absolute conclusions, but it definitely seems likely that this is a deliberate defensive ploy by Liverpool.
Why would Liverpool make this defensive choice?
This is the obvious question that follows, if this is a deliberate defensive choice by Liverpool, what value do they see in it? You’ll notice I’ve not yet mentioned goals conceded from long shots, and for good reason as in these sample sizes it would get very noisy, very quickly and suspect that this decision making has been devised beyond the variance of what flies in the net from outside the box over the course of one season.
Allowing shots from lower value locations
The first reason I would venture is one that I briefly touched on earlier, as teams become smarter in their own shot choices, it is logical that you want to tempt your opponents into making poor ones rather than accessing higher threat areas.
When it comes to jumping out to block shots, you are inevitably going to leave spaces behind you that can potentially be exploited by runs into depth and the opportunity for your opponent to create a higher threat situation. You are also likely to commit yourself and unable to participate in second actions such as rebounds, particularly if you end up on the deck trying to throw yourself in the way of a shot.
As these two clips show, the Burnley & Everton defences make the choice to jump out to a player who potentially may take a shot on from <0.10xG locations. The space they vacated however allows both Chelsea and Spurs to upgrade the probability of scoring quite significantly. There is a case that by being less active in getting out to block potential shots, you can guide opponents into taking that low probability shot on rather than seeking a better opportunity to attack the goal.
I suspect most coaches leave this area of the game down to individual decision making within the context that getting out and blocking shots is inherently good — in the case of the goal Burnley conceded in the above video, you’d probably imagine Sean Dyche to have been frustrated about the decision of both defenders to jump out to press Kante leaving Reece James alone, however I believe this is probably the result of an automatic response to get out and block a shot on goal.
Giving the GK a clearer line of sight
A (useful) ploy some teams utilise on attacking free kicks is screening the goalkeeper — by ensuring you have 1 or 2 players standing in a direct line between taker and the goalkeeper you can effectively reduce their reaction time as they will pick up the trajectory of the ball later on after leaving the boot.
This quite obviously is also something that is going to occur in open play situations too — this could be evidence that Liverpool are seeking to minimise the traffic in front of Alisson’s line of sight and thus giving him as optimal a vision and reaction time from these shots as often as possible. There is no denying that Alisson is a world-class goalkeeper, and maybe this is a defensive scheme that is further putting the odds in his favour as an exceptional shot-stopper.
It perhaps should be said that a successful block is a good thing in isolation, however with situations where one or multiple defenders are rushing out to block, making themselves big in the process, how often are these players obscuring the goalkeepers line of sight? By rushing out to put blocks in, are players turning what may be catches into rebound saves, and of course allowing goals that would likely have been saved had the keeper seen the ball off the boot and not when it emerges out of traffic? This could also be a reason why Liverpool seem to exert more sideways and backwards pressure on shooters as it is likely to disrupt a shot, but not obscure Alisson’s line of sight.
Control & predictability
A key principle often referenced in coach education when coaching individual and collective defending is to ‘make play predictable’. This could be showing a player into an area where they pose no threat, or allowing your opponent to circulate the ball in front of your defensive block where you have control of the situation. When it comes to making blocks as a defensive team, virtually anything can happen — it is highly unpredictable.
When a block is made, you are likely to end up in a second ball situation in an area you can’t predict — it could benefit you on the counterattack, it could also drop invitingly at an opponent’s feet in front of goal. This may be a level of unpredictability that Liverpool do not see an upside to within their own defensive third (or maybe they can predict outcomes of blocks through their super smart modelling and the effects of blocking shots…?).
What appears more predictable is by making fewer blocks, the outcomes of shots are more likely to end in a Liverpool possession. Of course the ball can sail into the top corner (indeed as did Lautaro’s strike that inspired this piece), but it is more likely to end up flying into the Kop or Alisson’s grateful hands. The chances of ending up in organised possession and the opportunity to build an attack are higher, and this may be a state of control and predictability that Liverpool prefer.
To conclude
It is worth reiterating that I do not know that Liverpool are making a conscious defensive choice to not be active in blocking long range shots, though I do feel there is enough quantitative and qualitative evidence to conclude fairly strongly that they are making different defensive decisions in this quite niche element of the game.
It is tempting to see Liverpool and conclude this must be smart thinking at play, but this piece was never intended to conclude whether it is good or bad football, other than speculate at reasons why this may be a deliberate ploy. Based on the evidence available, I certainly believe this is worthy of further inquiry.
From a data perspective, can we prove its value or not over based on long term modelling, and from a coaching perspective — do coaches have a strategy for teaching your players when and how to block (or not block) shots? It may not be an exciting area of the game to explore for many, but perhaps Liverpool have shown there is value in seeking edges with such seemingly minute aspects of the game.